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I. INTRODUCTION 
Consumers have a dual expectation when it comes to drugs and 
medical devices.  First, consumers hope and expect for the develop-
ment and distribution of helpful and life-saving drugs and medical 
devices.
1
  Second, consumers want to be protected from the potential 
dangers associated with such drugs and medical devices.
2
  The prob-
lem arises, however, in the fact that “the most important drugs and 
devices . . . both . . . save lives, and . . . cost lives.”
3
  The approval 
process of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for drugs and 
medical devices in conjunction with federal preemption allow for 
consumers’ dual expectation—the availability of life-saving products 
and protection from dangers associated with these products—to be 
met. 
The FDA, a federal administrative agency within the Department 
of Health and Human Services, is responsible for protecting and 
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2011, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., 2008, Universi-
ty of Maryland.  I wish to thank Professor Jordan Paradise and Andrew Boulay for all 
of their guidance throughout the writing process.  I would also like to thank my fami-
ly and friends for all of their support.   
 1 See Gerald Ford, President of the United States, Statement on Signing the Med-
ical Device Amendments of 1976 (May 28, 1976), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index. 
php?pid=6069 (explaining consumers’ hopes and expectations for life-saving drugs 
and devices); see also Medical Device Safety Act of 2009: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 1–2 (2009) (statement of 
Michael Kinsley) [hereinafter Kinsley Statement], available at 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090512/testimony_kinsley.pdf 
(testifying against the Medical Device Safety Act of 2009 because he suffers from Par-
kinson’s disease and has benefited from drugs and medical devices and because he is 
a journalist who has written “about the damage done to our economy and country by 
excessive litigation . . . over medical care”).  
 2 Kinsley Statement, supra note 1, at 1 (describing consumers’ desires for drugs 
and medical devices).  
 3 Id.  
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promoting public health by ensuring that drugs and medical devices 
are safe and effective.
4
  To ensure safety and efficacy, the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) grants the FDA the authori-
ty to oversee the introduction and approval of both new drugs and 
high-risk Class II and Class III medical devices.
5
  Before a new drug or 
medical device subject to approval can be distributed to the public, 
the FDA determines whether the benefits of the drug or medical de-
vice outweigh the risks associated with that drug or medical device.
6
  
As former President Gerald Ford explained, 
[The FDA] daily faces a most difficult task—preventing threats to 
the public health in a way that is not onerous, but fully consonant 
with the principles of competitive economic development on 
which this Nation was built.  It is a task that requires determina-
tion, scientific skill, judgment, and most of all, compassion for the 
hopes and needs of our fellow man.
7
 
The FDCA also gives the FDA the responsibility to promote public 
health and to ensure that new drugs and medical devices are devel-
oped and distributed.
8
 
Despite the FDA’s important role, there is an ongoing dispute as 
to whether the FDA’s approval of a drug or medical device should 
preempt a state tort claim that challenges the safety or effectiveness 
of that drug or device.  Federal preemption is a legal theory that 
permits federal law to override state law when that state law conflicts 
with federal law; the result is that the state law is preempted and 
“without effect.”
9
  The issue of federal preemption is relevant in the 
context of new drugs and medical devices as a result of two Supreme 
Court decisions.  In 2008, in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., the Supreme 
Court held that an express preemption provision in the FDCA 
preempts state tort claims that challenge FDA premarket-approved 
 
 4 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(2)(B)–(C) (2006).  The FDA is also responsible for oversee-
ing food and cosmetic products.  § 393(b)(2)(A), (D).   
 5 Id. § 355 (drugs); id. § 360c (devices).  See discussion of approval processes in-
fra Parts II.B, II.C.2.  Drugs and Devices are found in Chapter 5 of the FDCA and in-
clude sections 501–73.  These sections of the FDCA correspond to 21 U.S.C. §§ 351–
60.  
 6 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 142 (2000) (“The 
FDA must determine that there is a reasonable assurance that the product’s thera-
peutic benefits outweigh the risk of harm to the consumer.”). 
 7 Ford, supra note 1.  
 8 § 393(b)(1).  The FDA ensures that new drugs and medical devices are re-
viewed and marketed “promptly and efficiently.”  Id.  
 9 Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Maryland v. Loui-
siana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).    
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medical devices.
10
  In 2009, in Wyeth v. Levine, the Supreme Court 
held, in the absence of an express preemption provision, that FDA 
approval of a new drug does not preempt state tort failure-to-warn 
and defective-product claims.
11
  The distinct holdings in these two 
cases create a disparity between new drugs and medical devices.  Al-
though new drugs and devices are both subject to FDA approval and 
a finding of safety and efficacy, premarket-approved medical-device 
manufacturers are immune from state tort claims and new-drug 
manufacturers are not.  The main reason for this disparity is the lack 
of an express preemption provision for new drugs within the FDCA. 
As a result of the discord of Riegel and Wyeth, a call for safety and 
efficacy has been initiated, and Congress has indicated that change is 
necessary.
12
  Select members of Congress have expressed their view 
that the advantages of the state tort system and the dangers associated 
with drugs and devices indicate that there should be a uniform stan-
dard of no preemption for both new drugs and premarket-approved 
devices.
13
  The late Senator Edward Kennedy and Representative 
Frank Pallone introduced bills into both the Senate and House of 
Representatives in 2008 and 2009 that would effectually overturn the 
Riegel decision, amend the FDCA, and remove the express preemp-
tion provision for premarket-approved medical devices.
14
  Enactment 
of either iteration would resolve the current disparity, and neither 
premarket-approved medical-device manufacturers nor new-drug 
manufacturers would be able to argue federal preemption as a de-
fense to state law products liability claims. 
This proposed legislation, the Medical Device Safety Act 
(“MDSA”), has initiated a debate as to whether the current preemp-
tion provided in § 360k is beneficial or detrimental in the context of 
 
 10 See 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008); see also id. at 333 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stat-
ing the majority’s holding).  The express preemption provision is in § 360k of the 
FDCA. 
 11 See 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1204 (2009).  A failure-to-warn claim alleges that the seller 
of the product is liable for harm that is caused as the result of failing to provide a 
warning where a reasonable person would have included a warning.  RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 10(a) (1998).  A reasonable person would 
provide a warning if the product “poses a substantial risk of harm.”  Id. § 10(b)(1).  
Defective-product claims allege that the seller of a defective product is liable for 
harms caused as a result of the defect.  Id. § 1.  
 12 See Medical Device Safety Act of 2009, S. 540, 111th Cong. (2009); Medical De-
vice Safety Act of 2009, H.R. 1346, 111th Cong. (2009); Medical Device Safety Act of 
2008, S. 3398, 110th Cong. (2008); Medical Device Safety Act of 2008, H.R. 6381, 
110th Cong. (2008).  
 13 S. 540; H.R. 1346; S. 3398; H.R. 6381.   
 14 S. 540; H.R. 1346; S. 3398; H.R. 6381.  
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medical devices.
15
  This debate raised by the proposed legislation also 
exposes the same arguments for federal preemption in the context of 
new drugs.
16
  Opponents of federal preemption argue that preemp-
tion denies injured patients the opportunity to bring state tort claims 
that provide a means of compensation and relief.
17
  Proponents of 
preemption argue that preemption is necessary to promote innova-
tion and the development of risky yet beneficial drugs and devices 
because without preemption, manufacturers will be reluctant to pro-
duce drugs or devices if subject to state tort claims.
18
 
This Comment will argue that the FDCA should be amended to 
include an express preemption provision for new drugs so that new-
drug manufacturers and premarket-approved device manufactures 
will be treated uniformly. The FDA’s approval process serves as sup-
port for this recommended action because it ensures the safety and 
efficacy of new drugs and premarket-approved medical devices.  
Preemption helps promote innovation and development by encour-
aging manufacturers to develop new products and keep products on 
the market.  Finally, the approval process for new drugs is even more 
rigorous than the rigorous premarket-approval process for medical 
devices.  Therefore, preemption should continue to be recognized 
for premarket-approved devices and should be extended to new 
drugs. 
Part II of this Comment will analyze the legislative history of the 
FDA, the approval process of new drugs under § 505 of the FDCA, 
and the approval process of medical devices under § 513 of the 
FDCA.  Part III will discuss preemption generally, will summarize 
Medtronic v. Lohr,  Riegel, and Wyeth, which are the Supreme Court 
cases addressing preemption for medical devices and new drugs, will 
indicate the effect of these cases, and will explain the disparity that 
has resulted.  Part IV will argue for federal preemption after weighing 
 
 15 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2006); S. 540; H.R. 1346. 
 16 See, e.g., Press Release, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Health Leaders In-
troduce Legislation Reversing Supreme Court’s Medical Device Decision (Mar. 5, 
2009) [hereinafter Committee on Energy and Commerce], available at 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=
1518 (describing the positive outcomes of the decision against federal preemption in 
Wyeth and describing how the same benefits would result from passage of the MDSA); 
see also The Medical Device Safety Act of 2009: Hearing on S. 540, Before the Comm. on 
Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 111th Cong. 10 (2009) (statement of Peter Barton 
Hutt, former chief counsel of FDA) [hereinafter Hutt Statement], available at 
http://help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/hutt.pdf (describing the advantages of fed-
eral preemption).   
 17 See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 18 See infra Part IV.B.  
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the advantages and disadvantages of preemption and concluding that 
FDA approval is a sufficient substitute for state tort claims.  Part V will 
suggest a remedy for the disparity between medical devices and new 
drugs and will set forth the steps Congress should take to preserve the 
express preemption of medical devices and create an express 
preemption provision for new drugs. 
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FDA & AN OVERVIEW OF FDA 
APPROVAL OF NEW DRUGS AND MEDICAL DEVICES 
Congress and the FDA have indicated that the FDA has two 
principal responsibilities: to protect public health and to promote 
public health.
19
  In the last century, the FDA has been an important 
mechanism in protecting public health by assuring that drugs, medi-
cal devices, and other medical products and foods are safe, effective, 
and secure.
20
  The FDA has also been an important mechanism of 
promoting public health by allowing for the development and ap-
proval of new technology and innovations that “make medicines and 
foods more effective, safer, and more affordable.”
21
 
A. History of the FDA’s Legislative Provisions 
The first significant step towards safety and efficacy occurred in 
1906 when Congress enacted the Federal Food and Drug Act that 
prevented adulterated or misbranded foods, drugs, medicines, and 
liquors from being manufactured, sold, or transported.
22
  Because this 
act only reached adulteration and misbranding, further regulation 
soon became necessary, and on June 25, 1938, President Franklin De-
 
 19 21 U.S.C. § 393 (2006). 
The [FDA] shall promote the public health by promptly and efficiently 
reviewing clinical research and taking appropriate action on the mar-
keting of regulated products in a timely manner; . . .  [The FDA shall] 
protect the public health by ensuring that . . . drugs are safe and effec-
tive . . . [and] there is [a] reasonable assurance of the safety and effec-
tiveness of devices intended for human use[.] 
§ 393(b)(1), (2)(B)–(C).   
 20 See What We Do, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/default.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2010) 
[hereinafter What We Do] (describing the FDA’s mission); see also Medtronic, Inc. v. 
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996) (explaining the government’s role in protecting “the 
health of our people”).   
 21 What We Do, supra note 20.   
 22 Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, 59 Pub. L. No. 384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2006)).  Adulterated products are poison-
ous, unsanitary, and overall unsafe.  § 351(a).  Misbranded products contain mislead-
ing advertising or labeling.  Id. § 321(n). 
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lano Roosevelt signed the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(“FDCA”).
23
  A significant effect of the FDCA was that the FDA’s regu-
latory authority expanded to include medical devices and cosmetics. 
24
  The Act also gave the FDA the authority to regulate adulterated or 
misbranded medical devices and required all “new drug” manufac-
turers to submit a premarket notification, which included safety as-
surances, to the FDA.
25
  Section 201 of the FDCA defines a “new drug” 
as follows: 
Any drug . . . the composition of which is such that such drug is 
not generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific 
training and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of 
drugs, as safe and effective for use under the conditions pre-
scribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof[.]
26
 
In 1962, the Kefauver Drug Amendments were enacted “to streng-
then the new drug regulatory system.”
27
  The amendments required 
new drugs to undergo premarket approval instead of premarket noti-
fication and required that new drugs be found to be both safe and ef-
fective before being approved.
28
 
Although devices were subject to federal regulatory control as to 
adulteration
29
 and misbranding,
30
 devices were not subject to a pre-
 
 23 FDA History, Part II: The 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ 
ucm054826.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2010).    
 24 Id.  Devices were covered because at this time drugs were defined to include 
medical devices.  Peter Barton Hutt, A History of Government Regulation of Adulteration 
and Misbranding of Medical Devices, 44 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 99, 102 (1989).  
 25 Hutt, supra note 24, at 104.  At this time, the FDA only had regulatory authority 
to control the adulteration and misbranding of medical devices.  Id.   
 26 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (2006).  The FDCA defines a “drug” as: 
[A]rticles recognized in the official United States Pharmacopoeia, offi-
cial Homoeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or official Na-
tional Formulary, or any supplement to any of them; and . . . articles in-
tended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or 
prevention of disease in man or other animals; and . . . articles (other 
than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body 
of man or other animals . . . . 
§ 321(g)(1)(A)–(C).   
 27 Hutt, supra note 24, at 106.  
 28 Id.  A companion bill that would have required a similar premarket approval 
method for medical devices was also considered but was never passed.  Id.  See Part 
II.C.2 infra for a description of the premarket notification and premarket approval 
processes.   
 29 A drug or device is considered adulterated when it contains poisonous or un-
sanitary components or if it was manufactured, processed, packaged, etc., under un-
sanitary conditions.  21 U.S.C. § 351(a).   
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market-review process like new drugs.
31
  Medical technology was pro-
gressively advancing and new, more complex and potentially danger-
ous devices were being developed.
32
  The FDCA was in need of an 
amendment to expand its regulatory authority over medical devices.
33
  
This need was especially evidenced by the fact that there were con-
flicting state regulations for medical devices, and many states had 
created their own premarket regulations for medical devices.
34
 
In response, President Richard Nixon instructed the Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare (“HEW”) to establish a study 
group.
35
  Dr. Theodore Cooper chaired this group, the Study Group 
on Medical Devices (“Cooper Committee”).
36
  In September 1970, the 
Cooper Committee issued its report and concluded that medical de-
vices required a distinctive regulatory approach and that medical de-
vices should be classified and subject to different approval methods 
based on the classification assigned to the device.
37
  The recommen-
dations of the Cooper Committee became the basis for the Medical 
Device Amendments of 1976 (“MDA”).
38
  The MDA categorizes medi-
cal devices into classes based on their level of perceived risk: some 
devices undergo premarket notification, some undergo premarket 
approval, and some undergo neither.
39
 
B. FDA Approval of New Drugs 
Every year, the FDA approves approximately one-hundred new 
drugs.
40
  Section 505 of the FDCA regulates the approval of new drugs 
 
 30 A drug or device is considered misbranded when it is in any way false or mis-
leading.  Id. § 352(a). 
 31 Hutt, supra note 24, at 117.   
 32 Ford, supra note 1.   
 33 See SHARON FRANK, A NEW MODEL FOR EUROPEAN MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATION 
152 (2003). 
 34 Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 333 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
For example, California had its own premarket approval (“PMA”) process for medi-
cal devices.  Id.  
 35 FRANK, supra note 33, at 154.   
 36 Id.  
 37 Hutt, supra note 24, at 109–10. 
 38 FRANK, supra note 33, at 154.   
 39 21 U.S.C. § 360c (2006). 
 40 See Lawrence O. Gostin, Regulating the Safety of Pharmaceuticals: The FDA, Preemp-
tion, and the Public’s Health, 301 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2036, 2036 (2009) (describing the 
number of drugs approved each year); Drug Approval Reports, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMIN.: CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH,  
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/Scripts/cder/DrugsatFDA/index.cfm?fuseaction=Re
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and requires new-drug sponsors to file a New Drug Application 
(“NDA”) before the drug can be introduced into the market.
41
  Be-
fore filing the NDA, non-clinical and clinical testing must be con-
ducted by the sponsor to “demonstrate the safety and effectiveness of 
the [new] drug.”
42
  Prior to conducting clinical tests, however, the 
sponsor must file an Investigational New Drug Application (“IND”),
43
 
which allows the new drug to be lawfully shipped across state lines 
and undergo clinical testing in various states.
44
 
Once the IND is approved and clinical testing is complete, the 
drug’s sponsor can file a NDA with the FDA.  The NDA must include, 
among other things, all of the following: investigation reports that 
indicate whether or not the drug is safe and effective in its use; a list 
of the drug’s components; a statement of the drug’s composition; a 
description of how the drug is manufactured, processed, and pack-
aged; samples of the drug; and a proposed label.
45
  The NDA enables 
the FDA to review whether the drug is safe—that is, whether its bene-
fits outweigh its risks—and whether “substantial evidence” exists to 
demonstrate that the drug is effective, as based on adequate and well-
controlled studies.
46
  This “substantial evidence” standard for effec-
tiveness is defined as follows: 
[E]vidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled investiga-
tions, including clinical investigations, by experts qualified by 
scientific training and experience to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the drug involved, on the basis of which it could fairly and res-
ponsibly be concluded by such experts that the drug will have the 
 
ports.ReportsMenu (last visited Sept. 1, 2010) (reporting the drug applications that 
are approved each month).   
 41 § 355(a).   
 42 PETER BARTON HUTT, The Regulation of Drug Products by the United States Food and 
Drug Administration, in TEXTBOOK OF PHARMACEUTICAL MEDICINE (John P. Griffin & 
John O’Grady, eds. 2006), reprinted in PETER BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A. MERRILL & 
LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 676 (3rd ed. 2007).  
 43 21 C.F.R. § 312.20(b) (2010).   
 44 § 312.1(a).  The IND includes, among other things, the investigational plan, 
which may include the rationale for the study, what will be studied, the types of clini-
cal trials to be done, and the approach used to evaluate the drug.  § 312.23(a)(3)(iv). 
 45 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A)–(F) (2006).  The sponsor must also provide the pa-
tent number and patent expiration date.  Id.   
 46 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.126 (2010) (“Reports of adequate and well-controlled inves-
tigations provide the primary basis for determining whether there is ‘substantial evi-
dence’ to support the claims of effectiveness for new drugs.”).  Only one adequate 
and well-controlled study is needed to provide substantial evidence of effectiveness.  
21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2006). 
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effect it purports or is represented to have under the conditions 
of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the [label].
47
 
The NDA also allows the FDA to determine whether the drug is safe 
for use as the proposed label prescribes, recommends, and suggests 
and allows the FDA to determine whether the “methods used in 
manufacturing the drug and the controls used to maintain the drug’s 
quality are adequate to preserve the drug’s identity, strength, and 
purity,”
48
 (i.e., that there are current good manufacturing practices 
(“CGMP”)).
49
  If the NDA demonstrates that the new drug is safe and 
effective, the application will be approved.
50
 
Conversely, if the application in some way demonstrates that the 
new drug will be unsafe or ineffective, the FDA will not approve the 
application.  If a new drug application demonstrates that the drug is 
unsafe “under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or sug-
gested in the proposed label,” the FDA will not approve the applica-
tion.
51
  If “there is a lack of substantial evidence that the drug will 
have the effect” it is said to have under the “conditions of use pre-
scribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed [label],” the 
FDA will not approve the application because the drug is deemed in-
effective.
52
  Finally, if the proposed label is false or misleading, the 
FDA will not approve the application.
53
 
C. FDA Approval of Medical Devices 
The approval process for medical devices is found within the 
FDCA and was enacted as part of the Medical Device Amendments 
(“MDA”).  As the preamble to the MDA states, the MDA was enacted 
to ensure that medical devices are safe and effective by providing a 
process for premarket approval based in part on the drug approval 
 
 47 § 355(d). 
 48 § 355(b); see also New Drug Application (NDA), U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.,  
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopeda
ndApproved/ApprovalApplications/NewDrugApplicationNDA/default.htm (last vi-
sited Sept. 1, 2010) (describing the requirements of the NDA).  
 49 See 21 C.F.R. 210.1(a) (2010) (describing the CGMP used to ensure drugs meet 
the requirements for “manufactur[ing], processing, packing, or holding” that assure 
the drug’s safety).   
 50 § 355(d).  
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
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process.
54
  The legislation achieves this purpose by classifying medical 
devices into three different classes based on their risk and by requir-
ing the approval decision be based on whether there is “reasonable 
assurance” that the device is safe and effective.
55
  As the regulations 
explain, 
There is reasonable assurance that a device is safe when it can be 
determined, based upon valid scientific evidence, that the proba-
ble benefits to health from use of the device for its intended uses 
and conditions of use, when accompanied by adequate directions 
and warnings against unsafe use, outweigh any probable risks.  
The valid scientific evidence used to determine the safety of a de-
vice shall adequately demonstrate the absence of unreasonable 
risk of illness or injury associated with the use of the device for its 
intended uses and conditions of use.
56
 
Thus, the “reasonable assurances” standard for medical devices is sim-
ilar to the standard of safety for drugs, as both define safety to mean 
that the benefits outweigh the risks.
57
 
1. Classes of Medical Devices 
Class I medical devices pose the least risk and include devices 
that are not used to support or sustain life and “do not present a po-
tential unreasonable risk of illness or injury.”
58
  Class I medical devic-
es are only subject to “general controls” contained within various sta-
tutory provisions of the FDCA and FDA regulations promulgated 
under the authority set out in the FDCA.
59
  The provisions include 
adulteration in § 501 of the FDCA, misbranding in § 502, registration 
in § 510, banned devices in § 516, notification and other remedies in 
§ 518, records and reports in § 510, and other general provisions in § 
520.
60
  These statutory provisions are used to provide “reasonable as-
surance” that the device is safe and effective and thus that the prod-
ucts are not adulterated, misbranded, or banned.
61
  Unless exempt, 
 
 54 See Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 
(1976) (“An act to amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to provide for 
the safety and effectiveness of medical devices intended for human use.”). 
 55 § 360c. 
 56 21 C.F.R. § 860.7(d)(1) (2010). 
 57 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 58 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)(ii)(I)–(II). 
 59 21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(1) (2010). 
 60 Id. 
 61 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)(i).  “General controls are sufficient to provide rea-
sonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the device.”  21 C.F.R. § 
860.3(c)(1).  
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Class I medical devices are also subject to the 510(k)-approval 
process.
62
 
Class II medical devices are devices that require more than gen-
eral controls to provide “reasonable assurance” that the device is safe 
and effective and instead require special controls in addition to the 
general controls.
63
  Special controls include: 
promulgation of performance standards, postmarket surveillance, 
patient registries, development and dissemination of guidance 
documents (including guidance on the submission of clinical data 
in premarket notification in accordance with section 510(k) of 
the act), recommendations, and other appropriate actions.
64
 
Similar to Class I devices, unless exempt, Class II medical devices are 
also subject to the 510(k)-approval process.
65
 
When a device is considered high-risk or insufficient informa-
tion exists to prove safety and effectiveness based only on general or 
special controls, the device is classified as Class III.
66
  Class III medical 
devices are devices “purported or represented to be for a use in sup-
porting or sustaining human life or for a use which is of substantial 
importance in preventing impairment of human health, or [ . . . ] 
presents a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury[.]”
67
  Class 
III medical devices represent the riskiest devices, and because they 
require more than general or special controls to provide a “reasona-
ble assurance” of safety and efficacy, some Class III medical devices 
are subject to premarket approval (“PMA”).
68
 
2. PMA & Its Exceptions 
Similar to the new-drug-approval process, PMA-medical devices 
undergo clinical investigations to determine safety and effectiveness; 
as with the IND application for new drugs, PMA-medical devices must 
 
 62 See § 360c(f)(1); discussion infra Part II.C.2.  
 63 § 360c(a)(1)(B). 
 64 21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(2). 
 65 See § 360c(f)(1); discussion infra Part II.C.2.  
 66 § 860.3(c)(3). 
 67 § 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii)(I)–(II). 
 68 § 360c(a)(1)(C).  Some Class II medical devices also undergo PMA.  The FDA 
regulations do not require all Class III medical devices to be approved by PMA, and 
from 2003 to 2007, most Class III medical devices were approved through the 510(k) 
process.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-190, MEDICAL DEVICES: FDA 
SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO ENSURE HIGH-RISK DEVICE TYPES ARE APPROVED THROUGH THE 
MOST STRINGENT PREMARKET REVIEW PROCESS 16 (2009), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09190.pdf; see infra notes 75–78 and accompanying 
text.  
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get an Investigation-Device Exemption (“IDE”) approved to allow for 
lawful shipping of the device across state lines and clinical testing in 
various states.
69
  Once clinical testing is complete, the PMA process 
requires a device sponsor to submit an application that contains, 
among other things, the investigational reports from the clinical tests 
that demonstrate “whether or not [the] device is safe and effective”; a 
statement of the “components, ingredients, and properties, and of 
the [principle(s)] of operation” of the device; a description of the 
device’s manufacture, processing, packaging, and installation; sam-
ples of the device; and a proposed label.
70
  The FDA determines 
whether a PMA device is safe and effective based on the target indi-
viduals who will use the device and the “conditions of use prescribed, 
recommended, or suggested” in the label, as well as by comparing the 
benefits of the device with the risk of any injury or illness.
71
  Regula-
tors will deny a PMA application if, among other reasons, the infor-
mation in the application demonstrates a “lack of showing of reason-
able assurance that such device is safe,” “a lack of showing of 
reasonable assurance that the device is effective,” or that the pro-
posed label is “false or misleading.”
72
 
Most Class III medical devices are not subject to PMA.  Through 
a “grandfather clause,” Class III medical devices that were introduced 
into the market before Congress enacted the MDA and Class III med-
ical devices that are “substantially equivalent” to another already-
approved predicate device do not require PMA.
73
  A device is “sub-
stantially equivalent” if it “has the same intended use . . . and has the 
same technological characteristics as the predicate device or . . . has 
different technological characteristics” but the information showing 
that the device is substantially equivalent “demonstrates that the de-
vice is as safe and effective as a legally marketed device and . . . does 
 
 69 21 C.F.R. § 812.1(a) (2010); see also Device Advice: Investigational Device Exemption 
(IDE), U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.,  
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketY
ourDevice/InvestigationalDeviceExemptionIDE/default.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 
2010) (describing the IDE process and requirements).  IDEs are also used for clinical 
testing for devices approved by the 510(k) premarket-notification process.  Id.  While 
testing is being conducted, a PMA or 510(k) premarket notification does not need to 
be submitted.  Id. 
 70 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1)(A)–(C), (E)–(F).   
 71 Id. § 360c(a)(2)(A)–(C). 
 72 Id. § 360e(d)(2)(A)–(B), (D). 
 73 § 360e(b)(1)(A)–(B). 
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not raise different questions of safety and effectiveness than the pre-
dicate device.”
74
 
Instead of PMA, substantially equivalent devices, new Class I de-
vices, new Class II devices, and some Class III devices are subject to 
the 510(k)-approval process, which requires the submission of pre-
market notification (“PMN”) to the FDA.
75
  The PMN must include, 
among other things, the name and class of the device, a 510(k) sum-
mary that shows the basis for determining substantial equivalence, 
and the proposed label.
76
  Moreover, for devices claiming to be sub-
stantially equivalent to a predicate-Class III device, the PMN must also 
include “a summary of the types of safety and effectiveness problems 
associated with the type of devices being compared.”
77
 
Compared with PMA, obtaining FDA approval of a medical de-
vice through the 510(k) process is much easier and faster because es-
sentially all that is needed for 510(k) approval is a demonstration of 
“substantial equivalence,” as “safety and effectiveness data are not ex-
plicitly required.”
78
  For 510(k) clearance, a medical-device manufac-
turer only needs to give the FDA ninety days’ notice of its intent to 
market a device,
79
 and the standard fee for review is approximately 
$4,000.
80
  Conversely, the FDA approves or denies PMA-device appli-
 
 74 Id. § 360c(i)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). 
 75 Premarket Notification (510k), U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/howtomarketyou
rdevice/premarketsubmissions/premarketnotification510k/default.htm#se (last vi-
sited Nov. 1, 2010); see also 21 C.F.R. § 807.81 (2010).  As long as it is not exempt, a 
Class I or Class II medical device will be subject to the 510(k) process.  21 U.S.C. 
360c(f)(1).  The exempt devices include, among other things, anesthesiology devic-
es, cardiovascular devices, dental devices, neurological devices, and orthopedic de-
vices.  21 C.F.R. §§ 862–92 (2010).   
 76 21 C.F.R. § 807.92. 
 77 Id. 
 78 See Jonathan S. Kahan, Premarket Approval Versus Premarket Notification: Different 
Routes to the Same Market, 39 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 510, 515–16 (1984) (comparing 
the PMA and 510(k) processes).  For example, in December 2009, the 510(k) 
process approved more than 200 devices; however, no devices received PMA original 
approval.  See December 2009 510(k) Clearances, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/DeviceApprov
alsandClearances/510kClearances/ucm196259.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2010); De-
cember 2009 PMA Approvals, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/Device 
ApprovalsandClearances/PMAApprovals/ucm198613.htm (last visited May 20, 
2010). 
 79 21 U.S.C. § 360(k).   
 80 Premarket Notification [510(k)] Review Fees, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketY
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cations after 180 days,
81
 and the standard fee for review of a PMA ap-
plication is approximately $240,000.
82
  Furthermore, the 510(k) 
process is currently under review by the Institute of Medicine to de-
termine whether it “sufficiently protects patients and promotes public 
health.”
83
 
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S VIEW ON FDA APPROVAL AND PREEMPTION 
A. Preemption Generally 
Defendants use preemption as a defense to argue that federal 
law conflicts with, and thus supersedes, the state law that is the basis 
for the plaintiff’s claim.
84
  In state tort suits in which defendants argue 
preemption, the plaintiff is usually putting forth a common-law claim 
of strict liability or negligence and is seeking compensation for injury 
or other harm.
85
  When a court finds a state law preempted, the de-
fendant essentially receives immunity from the state tort claims and 
the plaintiff is left without compensation for his injury or harm.
86
 
The source of federal preemption is the Supremacy Clause in 
Article VI of the Constitution, which states that federal law “shall be 
the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”
87
  The Supreme 
Court clarified this constitutional provision by explaining that “state 
 
ourDevice/PremarketSubmissions/PremarketNotification510k/ucm134566.htm 
(last visited Sept. 1, 2010). 
 81 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(1)(A). 
 82 PMA Review Fees, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.,  
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketY
ourDevice/PremarketSubmissions/PremarketApprovalPMA/ucm048161.htm#fees 
(last visited Sept. 1, 2010). 
 83 Public Health Effectiveness of the FDA 510(k) Clearance Process, INSTITUTE OF 
MEDICINE, http://www.iom.edu/Activities/PublicHealth/510KProcess.aspx (last vi-
sited Sept. 1, 2010). 
 84 See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1192 (2009) (describing Wyeth’s preemp-
tion defense).  Preemption is defined as “the principle that a federal law can super-
sede or supplant any inconsistent state law or regulation.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1197 (7th ed. 1999). 
 85 See, e.g., Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1191–92 (describing Ms. Levine’s common law 
claims of strict liability and negligence and the initiation of her lawsuit to seek dam-
ages); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 320–21 (2008) (describing the Riegels’ 
common law claims of strict liability and negligence); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 
U.S. 470, 481 (1996) (describing the Lohrs’ state common law claims of strict liability 
and negligence).   
 86 See infra notes 93–94 and accompanying text.  But see infra note 99 and accom-
panying text.   
 87 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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law that conflicts with federal law is ‘without effect.’”
88
  When analyz-
ing preemption, the Supreme Court explained that there is an “as-
sumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be 
superseded by [a] Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest 
purpose of Congress.”
89
  This “clear and manifest purpose” is present 
when Congress has indicated through either express, implied, or con-
flict preemption that federal law will regulate a specific area, and, as a 
result, any state law covering that area will be preempted.
90
 
Express preemption occurs when Congress’s indication for 
preemption is “explicitly stated” in a statute.
91
  In Cipollone v. Liggett 
Group, the Supreme Court analyzed two statutes with expressly 
preemptive language: the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising 
Act of 1965 and the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969.
92
  
The court found that these two federal statutes regulating cigarettes 
expressly preempted some of the petitioner’s state tort claims,
93
 and 
the defendant was thus immune from liability stemming from these 
claims.
94
 
Implied preemption occurs when preemption is implied in the 
statute’s “structure and purpose.”
95
  More specifically, implied 
preemption occurs, in the absence of an express provision, “if federal 
law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field ‘as to make reasonable 
the inference that Congress left no room for the states to supplement 
it.’”
96
  The Supreme Court analyzed implied preemption in Silkwood v. 
Kerr-McGee Corp, holding that a federal law on nuclear safety did not 
 
 88 Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Maryland v. Loui-
siana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).    
 89 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 90 See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525–26 (1977).  
 91 Id. at 525.  
 92 505 U.S. 504, 514–15 (1992). 
 93 Id. at 530–31. 
The 1965 Act did not pre-empt state law damages actions; the 1969 Act 
pre-empts petitioner’s claims based on a failure to warn and the neu-
tralization of federally mandated warnings to the extent that those 
claims rely on omissions or inclusions in respondents’ advertising or 
promotions; the 1969 Act does not pre-empt petitioner’s claims based 
on express warranty, intentional fraud and misrepresentation, or con-
spiracy. 
Id. 
 94 Id. at 504. 
 95 Id. at 516 (quoting Jones, 430 U.S. at 525). 
 96 Id. (quoting Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 
(1982)). 
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preempt a state’s award of punitive damages to an individual harmed 
by plutonium that had leaked from a nuclear facility where the indi-
vidual worked.
97
  Despite a previous Supreme Court holding that 
Congress “occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns,”
98
 the 
Court in Silkwood found no preemption; thus, the defendant was not 
immune from liability, and the injured party was entitled to compen-
sation.
99
 
Finally, in the absence of an express provision and even when 
Congress has not entirely occupied the field, conflict preemption oc-
curs if the state law “conflicts with federal law.”
100
  The Supreme Court 
has identified two situations in which conflict preemption arises:
101
 
when a manufacturer could not possibly follow both the federal and 
state regulations
102
 or when “‘[state] law stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.’”
103
 
B. Preemption in the Context of Medical Devices and Drugs 
As of 2009, the Supreme Court has held that PMA-medical de-
vices are subject to preemption but that new drugs are not.
104
  One of 
the main reasons for this distinction is that the MDA includes an ex-
press preemption provision for medical devices that are subject to re-
view for safety and efficacy.
105
  The express preemption provision, in § 
521 of the FDCA, states that 
no State or political subdivision of a State may establish or con-
tinue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use 
any requirement (1) which is different from, or in addition to, 
any requirement applicable under this chapter to the device, and 
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to 
any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the de-
vice under this Act [21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq.].
106
 
 
 97 464 U.S. 238, 241, 249 (1984). 
 98 See id. (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. 
Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 212 (1983)). 
 99 Id. at 258. 
 100 Id. at 248.  Wyeth argued conflict preemption as a defense in Wyeth v. Levine.  
See infra notes 140–42 and accompanying text.   
 101 Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1208 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 102 Id. (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–
43 (1963)). 
 103 Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
 104 See infra Parts III.B.2–3.  
 105 See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006). 
 106 Medical Device Amendments of 1976 § 521, 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(1)–(2). 
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One of the main reasons that the MDA express preemption provision 
was added to the FDCA was that there were conflicting state regula-
tions for medical devices, and many states had created their own reg-
ulations for approval.
107
  The 1962 amendments did not require de-
vices to be subject to a premarket-review process for safety and 
efficacy,
108
 and because the FDA did not regulate safety and efficacy, 
the states did.  Therefore, a purpose of the express preemption provi-
sion was to coordinate device approval. 
1. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr 
One of the first cases to interpret the MDA express preemption 
provision was Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr.
109
  The case involved a pacemaker 
that was a Class III substantially equivalent medical device that had 
obtained approval in the 510(k) process.
110
  In Medtronic, the Supreme 
Court found that the 510(k)-approval process, which requires pre-
market notification and a finding of substantial equivalence, only 
provides minimal protection and, consequently, does not preempt 
state tort claims.
111
  In other words, the 510(k) process does not focus 
on safety or effectiveness but only focuses on equivalence; therefore, 
the Court explained that a finding of substantial equivalence “‘pro-
vide[s] little protection to the public.’”
112
 
The Court found that the MDA preempts state requirements 
that are specifically developed “with respect to” medical devices and 
are different from or additional to an FDA requirement specific to 
the device; the state requirements at issue and the minimal protec-
tions of 510(k) were only general requirements and were not specific 
to the device at issue.
113
  Thus, the express preemption provision in 
the MDA did not preempt the plaintiff’s state tort claims against 
Medtronic.  Because the 510(k) process approved the device in Med-
tronic, the Supreme Court only analyzed the MDA’s preemption pro-
 
 107 See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 333 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing) (describing regulations of states, including California, which had its own PMA 
process for medical devices).  
 108 Hutt, supra note 24, at 106.   
 109 518 U.S. 470 (1996). 
 110 See id. at 477.   
 111 See id. at 493–94 (explaining that the § 510(k) process “did not ‘require’ Med-
tronics’ pacemaker to take any particular form for any particular reason”).  
 112 Id. at 493 (quoting Robert Adler, The 1976 Medical Device Amendments: A Step in 
the Right Direction Needs Another Step in the Right Direction, 43 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 511, 
516 (1988)).   
 113 Id. at 501.  
MOTTES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2011  9:31 AM 
740 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:723 
vision in the context of that process.
114
  The Court did not consider 
the express preemption provision in the context of the PMA process 
until Riegel. 
2. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. 
Twelve years later, the Supreme Court again interpreted the ex-
press preemption provision in the MDA in a case that involved a Class 
III catheter that had received PMA.
115
  The plaintiff, Mr. Riegel, had a 
Medtronic Evergreen Balloon Catheter inserted into his coronary ar-
tery.
116
  During the surgery, his doctor inflated the catheter to a level 
beyond the maximum indicated on the label.
117
  Mr. Riegel’s coronary 
artery was both diffusely diseased and heavily calcified, two conditions 
that the device’s label warned were symptoms for which use of the ca-
theter was contraindicated.
118
  As a result, the catheter ruptured, and 
Mr. Riegel was forced to undergo emergency coronary-bypass sur-
gery.
119
  Although the doctor’s negligence played a significant role in 
Mr. Riegel’s injuries, Mr. Riegel also initiated a lawsuit against Med-
tronic in the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
New York.
120
  Mr. Riegel alleged that the catheter was “designed, la-
beled, and manufactured in a manner that violated New York com-
mon law.”
121
 
The Supreme Court held that the MDA in § 360k preempts 
“common-law claims challenging the safety and effectiveness” of de-
vices that received PMA.
122
  Accordingly, the express preemption pro-
vision acts as a defense for the manufacturers of Class III PMA devices 
from conflicting state-law claims and provides immunity to these 
manufacturers based on the fact that they complied with and were 
 
 114 Id.  
 115 Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 320 (2008).  Unlike the pacemaker in 
Medtronic, which was approved through the grandfather clause because it was sub-
stantially equivalent, the catheter in Riegel was approved through PMA.  See supra note 
110 and accompanying text.  As of 1996, when the Court decided Medtronic, “the FDA 
[had] not yet initiated nor suggested the initiation of a PMA process for pacemakers 
or most other grandfathered devices.”  Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 478 n.3.   
 116 Riegel, 552 U.S. at 320. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id.  Mr. Riegel’s common law claims were negligence, breach of warranty, and 
strict liability.  Id. 
 121 Id.  
 122 Riegel, 552 U.S. at 315. 
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approved by the FDA’s PMA.
123
  Unlike Medtronic, the Supreme Court 
held that PMA is a specific requirement relating to safety and efficacy 
and thus has a preemptive effect.
124
  Therefore, after Medtronic and 
Riegel, the 510(k) process, which focuses on equivalence and not safe-
ty, does not have a preemptive effect, but the PMA process, which fo-
cuses on safety and not equivalence, does have a preemptive effect.
125
 
The Court emphasized that the MDA-preemption provision only 
preempts state requirements that are “different from, or in addition 
to” federal requirements.
126
  The Court explained that federal law 
does not preempt state requirements that parallel FDA requirements, 
such as those that provide damages for a manufacturer’s violation of 
FDA regulations.
127
  Riegel’s holding in favor of preemption only ap-
plies to the limited number of Class III medical devices that have met 
PMA.
128
  Therefore, the preemption provision does not apply to Class 
I devices, Class II devices, or Class III devices that are found to be 
substantially equivalent and approved under the § 510(k)-approval 
process.
129
 
3. Wyeth v. Levine 
A year later, in Wyeth v. Levine, the Supreme Court addressed 
whether the FDA’s drug-labeling requirements and approval preempt 
state tort claims regarding the adequacy of the label, and more specif-
ically, failure-to-warn claims.
130
  The Court held that the FDA’s ap-
proval of the drug, which in effect approves the label that the sponsor 
provides as part of the NDA, does not preempt a state tort claim.
131
  
Because no express preemption provision relating to drugs exists, the 
Court analyzed whether implied preemption applied.
132
 
The case involved the Wyeth-manufactured drug Phenergan, 
which the FDA initially approved in 1955, and which is used to treat 
nausea and can be administered intravenously through either an “IV-
 
 123 See id.; see also id. at 333 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating the majority’s hold-
ing).  
 124 Id. at 322–23 (majority opinion). 
 125 Id. at 323. 
 126 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(1) (2006); Riegel, 552 U.S. at 328. 
 127 Riegel, 552 U.S. at 329–30. 
 128 Id. 
 129 See supra Part II.A.   
 130 Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1193 (2009). 
 131 Id. at 1191. 
 132 Id. at 1199–1200.  
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push” or “IV-drip” method.
133
  Diana Levine was suffering from a mi-
graine headache and nausea, and she initially received an intramus-
cular injection of Phenergan.
134
  The first injection did not ease her 
suffering, and although Phenergan’s label warned that extreme care 
should be used to avoid the IV-push method because gangrene and 
amputation could result,
135
 Ms. Levine was given another injection of 
Phenergan through the IV-push method.
136
  The second IV-push in-
jection caused Phenergan to enter her artery; as a result, Ms. Levine 
developed gangrene, and consequently, her entire right forearm was 
amputated.
137
 
Ms. Levine sued Wyeth based on a failure-to-warn claim arguing 
that Phenergan’s label was defective because it did not specifically 
give instructions to use the IV-drip method as opposed to the IV-push 
method.
138
  Ms. Levine also argued that the IV-push method was un-
safe as its risks far outweighed its benefits.
139
  Wyeth argued that both 
types of conflict preemption preempted Ms. Levine’s claim, i.e., that 
it was impossible to follow the state’s label requirements “without vi-
olating federal law” and that Ms. Levine’s state tort action was an 
“‘obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress because it substitutes a lay jury’s decision 
about drug labeling for the expert judgment of the FDA.”
140
 
In response to Wyeth’s first argument, the Court held that 
Wyeth could have complied with the state requirements of adding a 
stronger label without violating federal law.
141
  To the second argu-
 
 133 Id. at 1191.  The “IV-push” method injects the drug “directly into a patient’s 
vein.”  Id.  The “IV-drip” method first injects the drug into a hanging intravenous bag 
containing saline solution, and then the drug is injected from the bag and through a 
catheter into the patient’s vein.  Id. 
 134 Id.  Specifically, the Phenergan was administered to treat her nausea, and Ms. 
Levine received Demerol to treat her headache.  Id.   
 135 Id. at 1191 & n.1. 
 136 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1191. 
 137 Id.  Phenergan entered her artery either because intra-arterial injection oc-
curred, where the needle entered the artery, or because perivascular extravasation 
occurred, where Phenergan entered the tissue surrounding her veins.  Id.  
 138 Id. at 1191–92.  Ms. Levine’s claims were based on common-law strict liability 
and negligence.  Id. at 1191.  
 139 Id. at 1192. 
 140 Id. at 1193–94 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 
U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).  As to the first argument, the state requirements would have re-
quired Wyeth to modify the label and warn of the IV-push method’s hazards.  Id. at 
1193. The federal law, the “changes being effected” regulation, would have allowed 
Wyeth to strengthen its warning without receiving FDA approvals through a supple-
mental application.  Id. at 1196–97; 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A) (2010). 
 141 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1198. 
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ment, the Court concluded “from silence that Congress believed state 
lawsuits pose no obstacle to federal drug-approval objectives.”
142
  
Thus, the Court held that no implied preemption applied to Ms. Le-
vine’s state tort claim. 
In reaching its decision, the Court also considered the FDA’s po-
sition on preemption at the time of the case.  In 2006, in the pream-
ble to a drug-label regulation, the FDA voiced its position in favor of 
preemption by indicating that its approval is preemptive; the FDA 
stated that “FDA approval of labeling . . . preempts conflicting or con-
trary State law” and that the FDA’s approval is now both a floor and a 
ceiling.
143
  The Court ultimately decided that the FDA’s position was 
inherently suspect and that no deference should be given to this new 
position because the FDA had changed its position without giving an-
yone notice or an opportunity to comment.
144
 
C. Effects of Riegel and Wyeth 
1. Lack of Uniformity Between Medical Devices and New 
Drugs 
As a result of the Riegel and Wyeth decisions, there is a lack of un-
iformity as to preemption.  The manufacturers of premarket-
approved Class III medical devices can utilize the express preemption 
provision as a defense and are immune from state tort liability, but 
the manufacturers of new drugs cannot take advantage of any 
preemption defense and will still be subject to state tort liability.  In-
terestingly, both cases analyzed the FDA’s approval process in decid-
ing the issue of preemption but came to conflicting conclusions.
145
  
The Riegel decision indicated that the FDA’s approval process is suffi-
cient to shield the PMA-medical-device manufacturer from liability, 
but the Wyeth decision seemed to suggest that the state tort system is 
still needed to supplement the FDA’s new-drug-approval process.
146
  
These conflicting Supreme Court decisions raise questions as to 
whether FDA approval is sufficient to protect and make whole a 
plaintiff without state tort actions and whether courts should contin-
 
 142 See id. at 1216 (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing the majority’s holding). 
 143 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription 
Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934–35 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be co-
dified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, and 601) [hereinafter Requirements I].  See infra 
notes 163–68 and accompanying text. 
 144 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1201; see infra notes 163–68 and accompanying text.   
 145 See supra Parts III.B.2–3.   
 146 See id.   
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ue to treat PMA-medical devices and new drugs differently with re-
gard to federal preemption.  These issues will be analyzed in Parts IV 
and V. 
2. Why the Issues of Preemption, FDA Approval, State 
Tort Actions, and Uniformity are Important Now 
The preemption and uniformity issues surrounding PMA medi-
cal devices and new drugs are especially relevant now.  As a result of 
Riegel and Wyeth, a call for safety and efficacy has been initiated, and 
Congress has indicated that change is necessary.
147
  In both 2008, fol-
lowing Riegel, and 2009, following Wyeth, legislation was introduced 
that would effectively overrule Riegel and amend the MDA to remove 
preemption for Class III medical devices.
148
  Select members of Con-
gress indicated their view that the protections of the state tort system 
and a uniform standard of no preemption for both new drugs and 
PMA devices are superior to allowing preemption.
149
 
On March 5, 2009, the day following the decision in Wyeth, the 
Medical Device Safety Act of 2009 (“MDSA”) was introduced into 
both the House of Representatives and the Senate.
150
  The MDSA 
would amend § 521 of the FDCA, which is the MDA express preemp-
tion provision relating to PMA medical devices, by adding the follow-
ing: “nothing in this section shall be construed to modify or otherwise 
affect any action for damages or the liability of any person under the 
law of any State.”
151
  The MDSA would prevent device manufacturers 
from using the express preemption provision as a defense to argue 
that the MDA preempts state tort claims even if their Class III device 
 
 147 See Medical Device Safety Act of 2009, S. 540, 111th Cong. (2009); Medical De-
vice Safety Act of 2009, H.R. 1346, 111th Cong. (2009); Medical Device Safety Act of 
2008, S. 3398, 110th Cong. (2008); Medical Device Safety Act of 2008, H.R. 6381, 
110th Cong. (2008).  When introducing the Medical Device Safety Act into the 
House of Representatives, Frank Pallone of New Jersey stated:  
[T]he Supreme Court rightfully upheld a patient’s right to legal re-
course after sustaining an injury from a pharmaceutical product.  To-
day, we introduce legislation that gives patients that same right when 
injured by a medical device.  This legislation puts safety first and elimi-
nates the blanket immunity that medical device companies currently 
enjoy thanks to an unfortunate Supreme Court decision last year.   
Committee on Energy and Commerce, supra note 16. 
 148 See S. 540; H.R. 1346; S. 3398; H.R. 6381. The legislation has not been passed 
as of the date of publication.   
 149 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.   
 150 S. 540; H.R. 1346.  The sponsor of the bill in the Senate was the late Senator 
Edward Kennedy, and the sponsor of the bill in the House of Representatives was 
Representative Frank Pallone.  S. 540; H.R. 1346. 
 151 S. 540; H.R. 1346. 
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was approved through the PMA process and even if the state imposed 
additional or different requirements.
152
  This proposed legislation and 
the Riegel and Wyeth decisions have sparked a debate as to whether 
preemption is beneficial or detrimental in the context of PMA medi-
cal devices and whether preemption should continue for PMA devic-
es.  Although the only legislation that has been proposed is in regard 
to medical devices, the same arguments for and against the legisla-
tion are also relevant in the context of federal preemption of new 
drug approvals. 
Opponents of preemption argue that preemption denies injured 
patients the opportunity to bring state tort claims that provide a 
means of compensation and relief.
153
  One such opponent is Presi-
dent Barack Obama, and although the MDSA has not been ap-
proved,
154
 the MDSA or similar legislation may have a better chance of 
being approved in the future because of changes initiated by Presi-
dent Obama’s administration.
155
  On May 20, 2009, President Obama 
issued a memorandum regarding preemption to the heads of the ex-
ecutive departments and agencies.
156
  In the memorandum, President 
Obama stressed the importance of balance between the federal gov-
ernment and the states and indicated that in many instances, states 
have protected the public’s health and safety “more aggressively” 
than the federal government.
157
  President Obama stated, 
“[P]reemption of State law by executive departments and agencies 
should be undertaken only with full consideration of the legitimate 
prerogatives of the States and with a sufficient legal basis for preemp-
tion.”
158
  Additionally, President Obama indicated that preemption 
provisions or language should not be added to regulatory preambles 
or codified regulations and that such preemption provisions that 
have been added in the last ten years should be reevaluated.
159
 
 
 152 See Gregory J. Wartman, Life After Riegel: A Fresh Look at Medical Device Preemp-
tion One Year After Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 291, 311 (2009) 
(explaining the possible consequences that would result if the MDSA is passed).   
 153 See infra Part IV.A.2.   
 154 S. 3398, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R. 6381, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 155 See Memorandum from the White House Office of the Press Sec’y to the Heads 
of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies (May 20, 2009) [hereinafter Memorandum], available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Presidential-Memorandum-
Regarding-Preemption/. 
 156 Id.  
 157 See id. (describing the effects of preemption).   
 158 Id. 
 159 See id. (explaining what the heads of departments and agencies should avoid 
with regard to preemption).  
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On the other hand, many proponents of preemption argue that 
it is necessary to promote innovation and the development of risky 
yet beneficial medical devices because, without preemption, manu-
facturers will be reluctant to produce new devices knowing they could 
be subject to state tort claims.
160
  Such proponents in favor of preemp-
tion include the FDA during President George W. Bush’s term and 
the Bush Administration.
161
  During his administration, President 
Bush appointed officials who supported preemption.
162
  These ap-
pointments were especially evident in the FDA, which changed its po-
sition on preemption during the Bush Presidency.
163
  For many years, 
the FDA believed that “Congress wanted federal approval and tort 
liability to operate simultaneously, ‘each providing a significant, yet 
distinct, layer of consumer protection.’”
164
  For example, prior to 
Bush’s administration, the FDA indicated that a proposed rule 
amending drug-label regulations “[did] not preempt State law.”
165
  
During this time, the government indicated that the FDA’s approval 
was a floor and that “states could provide ‘additional protection to 
consumers.’”
166
  But in 2006, the FDA changed its position to favor 
preemption.
167
  The FDA stated that “FDA approval of labeling . . . 
 
 160 See infra Part IV.B and accompanying text.  
 161 See Requirements I, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3922 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at 
21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, and 601) (describing the FDA’s position on preemption dur-
ing the Bush Administration); Richard L. Cupp Jr., Preemption’s Rise (and a Bit of a 
Fall) as Products Liability Reform Wyeth, Riegel, Altria, and The Restatement (Third)’s Pre-
scription Product Design Defect Standard, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 727, 746 (2009) (describing 
President Bush’s actions regarding preemption).   
 162 See Cupp, supra note 161, at 746 (explaining the steps Bush took during his 
administration in dealing with preemption).  
 163 Compare Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Pre-
scription Drugs and Biologics; Requirements for Prescription Drug Product Labels, 
65 Fed. Reg. 81082 (Dec. 22, 2000) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 201) [hereinafter 
Requirements II] (describing the FDA’s position that their approval did not preempt 
state tort claims), with Requirements I, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922 (describing the FDA’s posi-
tion that their approval did preempt).  
 164 Lawrence O. Gostin, The Deregulatory Effects of Preempting Tort Litigation: FDA 
Regulation of Medical Devices, 299 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2313, 2314 (2008) (quoting Marga-
ret Jane Porter, The Lohr Decision: FDA Perspective and Position, 52 FOOD  & DRUG L.J. 7 
(1997)). 
 165 Requirements II, 65 Fed. Reg. at 81103.     
 166 Robert Pear, In a Shift, Bush Moves to Block Medical Suits, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 
2004, at N18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/25/politics/ 
25DRUG.html (citing the views of “the government” as of 1997).   
 167 Requirements I, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3934–35; see supra notes 143–44. 
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preempts conflicting or contrary State law” and that the FDA’s ap-
proval is now both a floor and a ceiling.
168
 
The transition from the Bush Administration in 2008 to the Ob-
ama Administration in 2009, the change in the FDA’s position during 
Bush’s Administration, and the introduction of the MDSA or future 
similar legislation could have a significant effect on preemption now 
and in the future.  The changes could potentially eliminate preemp-
tion completely for FDA approved medical devices and new drugs.  
This is because Wyeth indicated a resistance to finding implied 
preemption and Congress is attempting to eliminate express preemp-
tion.  But the potential consequences of Obama’s administration and 
the MDSA—no preemption—may not be the most beneficial solu-
tion.  Instead, the advantages of preemption should be given more 
consideration in determining what position the executive, legislative, 
and judicial branches should take on the issue of preemption.
169
 
IV. THE ADVANTAGES OF PREEMPTION IN THE CONTEXT OF MEDICAL 
DEVICES AND NEW DRUGS 
A. Is FDA Approval a Sufficient Substitute for the State Tort System? 
If the current discord is remedied in the FDCA, preemption in 
the context of PMA medical devices and new drugs would afford a 
manufacturer who has received FDA approval of a PMA medical de-
vice or a new drug immunity from state tort liability.  The FDA’s ap-
proval process for both medical devices and drugs would preempt the 
conflicting state law that is the basis of the state tort claim.
170
  The fact 
that a new drug or PMA device received FDA approval would prevent 
an injured individual from seeking recourse through the state tort 
system.  These injured individuals want access to new drugs and de-
vices, but they also want to be protected from such drugs and devices.  
Based on these considerations, the issue is whether or not FDA ap-
proval and preemption is a sufficient substitute for the state tort sys-
tem. 
 
 168 Requirements I, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3934–35; see supra notes 143–44.  But, the 2006 
preamble is not the first time the FDA has expressed a preemptive view, and the FDA 
has “previously preempted State law requirements relating to drugs in rulemaking 
proceedings.”  See Requirements I, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3935.  For example, the FDA has 
included preemptive statements in regulations for over-the-counter drugs in 1982, 
for aspirin manufacturers in 1986, and for the “disclosure of adverse event-related 
[confidential] information.”  Id.  
 169 See infra Part IV. 
 170 See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.  
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1. Advantages of FDA Approval 
Although the FDA-approval processes for new drugs and PMA 
devices are distinct, both processes are rigorous.
171
  When Congress 
gave the FDA the authority to oversee the introduction and approval 
of new drugs and medical devices, Congress’ goal was to ensure that 
public health would be protected and that new drugs and medical 
devices would be safe and effective.
172
  As indicated in Medtronic, the 
FDA is the government administrative agency given the authority to 
carry out the approval process and the other provisions of the 
FDCA.
173
  As a result, many argue that the FDA is in a better position 
to determine the safety and efficacy of a new drug or PMA medical 
device than a jury.
174
 
The FDA has been overseeing the approval of new drugs since 
1938 and the approval of medical devices since 1976.
175
  This makes 
the FDA uniquely qualified to determine whether a particular form of 
state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution 
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” and whether it 
should be pre-empted.
176
  The FDA is “the expert Federal [public 
health] agency,”
177
 and as an expert, the FDA looks at the effects of a 
medical product as a “whole instead of focusing on a few individuals, 
which occurs in many jury trials.”
178
  The “FDA is in a better position” 
 
 171 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475–77 (1996) (noting that the PMA 
process “is a rigorous one.”); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 343 (2008) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he process for approving new drugs is at least as ri-
gorous as the premarket approval process for medical devices.”). 
 172 See 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(2)(B) (2006); see also Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 474–75 (de-
scribing the FDA’s mission). 
 173 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 496. 
 174 See Hutt Statement, supra note 16, at 11 (comparing the FDA as an expert 
agency and a jury as a group of random individuals); The Safety of Medical Products Re-
gulated by the FDA: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 
111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Randall Luther, Ph.D., FDA) [hereinafter Luther 
Statement], available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/ 
ucm101513.htm. 
 175 See supra Part II.A.   
 176 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
 177 Timothy Ardizzone, The FDA: Advocate or Regulator of the Pharmaceutical Industry? 
The Attempted Preemption by the FDA of State Tort Claims for Failure-to-Warn on Pharmaceut-
ical Labeling, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 763, 786 (2006) (quoting Requirements I, 71 Fed. 
Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, and 601)). 
 178 See id. (describing the FDA’s arguments in Requirements I, 71 Fed. Reg. at 
3934). 
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than a jury to make determinations of safety and efficacy.
179
  As Justice 
Breyer declared, 
[W]ho would you rather have make the decision that this [prod-
uct] is, on balance, going to save people or, on balance, is going 
to hurt people?  An expert agency, on one hand, or 12 people 
pulled randomly for a jury role, who see before them only the 
people whom the [product] hurt and don’t see the people who 
need the [product] to cure them?
180
 
Juries are not capable of balancing the risks and benefits of a drug or 
device the way that the FDA can because a jury is only concerned with 
the risks and dangers of a product rather than its benefits.
181
  The jury 
views only the injured, suffering patient and is persuaded by his tra-
gedy while the FDA considers the possible risks and considers the pa-
tients who require the device or drug and would suffer without it.
182
 
2. Advantages of the State Tort System and Concerns with 
the FDA 
In the absence of preemption, state tort suits can be helpful for 
individuals injured by a new drug or PMA device, and many argue 
that preemption is detrimental because it removes the advantages of 
these suits.
183
  As the late Senator Edward Kennedy stated, “Congress 
never intended that FDA approval would give blanket immunity to 
manufacturers from liability for injuries caused by faulty devices.”
184
  
State tort suits allow individuals injured by a new drug or device to 
seek compensation for their injuries and to impose liability on the 
manufacturer.
185
  These suits can reveal the dangers associated with 
the drug or device because the injured plaintiff must explain how 
 
 179 See Hutt Statement, supra note 16, at 10 (comparing the FDA as an expert 
agency and a jury as a group of random individuals). 
 180 See id. (quoting Justice Breyer); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 30–31, 
Warner Lambert v. Kent, 552 U.S. 440 (2008) (No. 06-1948). 
 181 Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1229 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting); Riegel v. 
Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 325 (2008). 
 182 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1230 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 183 See id. at 1202 (majority opinion) (explaining the advantages of the state tort 
system for the injured); Brief for NEJM Editors and Authors as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Respondents, Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249), 2008 
WL 3851616 at *38–39 (describing the benefits of the state tort system); Kennedy, Pal-
lone Eye Legislation to Undo Preemption Ruling, FDA WK., Feb. 29, 2008, available at 2008 
WLNR 4025500 (describing Senator Kennedy’s view in opposition of preemption).   
 184 Kennedy, Pallone Eye Legislation to Undo Preemption Ruling, supra note 183. 
 185 See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1202 (explaining the advantages of the state tort sys-
tem).  
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and why he was injured to initiate the state tort suit.
186
  An injured 
plaintiff’s revelation can expose previously unknown dangers related 
to the use or misuse of the drug or device and can incentivize manu-
facturers to disclose such risks.
187
  Manufacturers are motivated to 
provide adequate warnings and to insure that their products are safe 
and effective because they want to avoid future liability and compen-
sation to the injured party.
188
  In sum, the state tort system holds 
manufacturers responsible and protects consumers. 
The state tort system also acts as a backup for plaintiffs to ensure 
safety and efficacy because the FDA’s approval may not always be suf-
ficient.
189
  In a brief in support of Ms. Levine in Wyeth, editors of the 
New England Journal of Medicine argued that because the FDA must 
depend on the manufacturer for the information used in determin-
ing safety and efficacy in the application for approval and for infor-
mation post-approval, the FDA is limited in knowing what the possi-
ble risks are; acting alone, they argued, the FDA is unable to ensure 
completely that products are safe and effective.
190
  Conversely, the 
state tort system, through the discovery process, requires manufactur-
ers to “disclose everything they know or reasonably should know” re-
garding the safety and efficacy of their products.
191
 
Moreover, just because the FDA has approved a PMA device or 
drug does not ensure that it will remain safe because many risks do 
not become apparent until after the product has entered the market 
and been used for many years.
192
  The FDA cannot “anticipate and 
protect against all safety risks,” and no matter how rigorous the ap-
 
 186 Id.  
 187 Id.  
 188 Id. at 1200; see also William P. Gunnar, Is There an Acceptable Answer to Rising 
Medical Malpractice Premiums?, 13 ANN. HEALTH L. 465, 478 (2004) (“An essential ele-
ment of the United States tort system is a requirement that the injured party be re-
turned to whole, best achieved through a pecuniary award.”). 
 189 See Brief for NEJM Editors and Authors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respon-
dents, Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249), 2008 WL 3851616 at 
*3–4.   
 190 See id. (“[T]he FDA alone simply lacks the ability to serve as the sole guarantor 
of drug safety.”).  
 191 Gostin, supra note 164, at 2315. 
 192 See Gregory D. Curfman, Stephen Morrissey & Jeffrey M. Drazen, Why Doctors 
Should Worry About Preemption, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1, 1 (2008) (analyzing the dan-
gerous side effects of various drugs that were uncovered after they were approved).  
For example, four drugs (Aprotinin, Dexfenfluramine, Rofecoxib, and Rosiglita-
zone) were all approved by the FDA, but then years later, each of these drugs dem-
onstrated life-threatening risks and some were subsequently removed from the mar-
ket.  Id.    
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proval process, safety issues could still be present.
193
  Thus, the state 
tort system acts as a backup and can expose risks where the FDA is 
unable to do so.
194
 
The FDA may also be unable to continue to meet its mission of 
protecting the public and ensuring safety and efficacy.
195
  Recently, 
the FDA’s demands have increased, but its resources have not in-
creased in proportion to these demands.
196
  In a 2008 study, the FDA 
Science Board’s Subcommittee on Science and Technology submit-
ted a report concluding that because of inadequate funding and re-
sources, the FDA has faced numerous “inadequacies that threaten 
our society” and that the “FDA can no longer fulfill its mission with-
out substantial and sustained additional appropriations.”
197
  The Insti-
tute of Medicine also found that the FDA “lacks the resources needed 
to accomplish its large and complex mission today, let alone to posi-
tion itself for an increasingly challenging future.”
198
 
3. Why FDA Approval Is Superior to State Tort Claims 
Despite the arguments in favor of state tort claims, the only real 
advantage of the state tort system is the compensation it can give to 
injured individuals.  Although preemption does not provide compen-
sation to those injured, its other advantages balance the lack of com-
pensation.  For example, the FDA has its own methods of exposing 
risks and ensuring safety after the product has been approved.
199
  
 
 193 See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 337 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting the former chief counsel to the FDA).  
 194 See Gostin, supra note 164, at 2314 (describing the advantages of the state tort 
system).  
 195 See id; see also Medical Devices: Shortcomings in FDA’s Premarket Review, Postmarket 
Surveillance, and Inspections of Device Manufacturing Establishment: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (state-
ment of Marcia Crosse, Director, Health Care, U.S. Gov’t. Accountability Office), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09370t.pdf (“Recently, concerns have 
been expressed about FDA’s ongoing ability to fulfill its mission of ensuring the safe-
ty and efficacy of medical products, including drugs . . . and devices.”). 
 196  GAIL CASSELL, FDA SCI. BD.’S SUBCOMM. ON SCI. AND TECH., FDA SCIENCE AND 
MISSION AT RISK: ESTIMATED RESOURCES REQUIRED FOR IMPLEMENTATION 3 (2008), 
available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_110/022508.ScienceBoard 
Report.EstimatedResources.pdf. 
 197 Id. 
 198 INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE 
HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 193 (National Academies Press 2007), available at 
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11750&page=193.  
 199 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(k), (e), § 360e(e) (2006).  The state tort system may also be 
helpful in exposing injuries that result from the drug or medical device but only af-
ter someone has been injured.  See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1202 (2009).   
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Post-approval, new drug and PMA device manufacturers must report 
any new information discovered that may affect the safety or efficien-
cy of the drug or device, and once the FDA becomes aware of this 
new information, it can withdraw its approval of the drug or device or 
amend the label.
200
 
With respect to new drugs, the sponsor must maintain records of 
clinical data and other information received relating to the drugs, 
and the sponsor must report these findings to the FDA.
201
  If these 
records, new clinical evidence, or new information demonstrate that 
a particular new drug is unsafe for use or if new information demon-
strates that substantial evidence of the drug’s effectiveness no longer 
exists, the FDA can withdraw its approval of the drug.
202
  If the FDA 
finds that an “imminent hazard to public health” is present, the FDA 
can also suspend the drug’s approval.
203
  Moreover, the FDA has an 
Adverse Event Reporting System (AERS) that monitors for “new ad-
verse events” of drugs as reported by healthcare professionals and 
consumers to either the FDA or the manufacturer, who then reports 
to the FDA.
204
  If the AERS shows a potential safety concern, the FDA 
“may take regulatory action(s) to improve product safety and protect 
the public health.”
205
 
Additional post-approval measures were taken in 2007 when the 
Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (“FDAAA”) 
was added to the FDCA.
206
  Specifically, § 505 of the FDCA was 
amended to add provisions for “active postmarket risk identification,” 
which would create a “postmarket risk identification and analysis sys-
 
 200 § 355(k), (e).  
 201 § 355(k), (e).  If records are not maintained, the FDA could withdraw approv-
al.  Id. 
 202 § 355(e).   
 203 Id.  
 204 Adverse Event Reporting System (AERS), U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.,   
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Surveillan
ce/AdverseDrugEffects/default.htm (last visited  Nov. 16., 2010).  Healthcare profes-
sionals include doctors, pharmacists, nurses, etc., and consumers include patients, 
family members, lawyers, etc.  Id. 
 205 Id.  
 206 Food and Drug Amendments Act of 2007, H.R. 3580, 110th Cong. (2007).  As 
the preamble explains, the FDAAA was added: 
[T]o amend the [FDCA] to revise and extend the user-fee programs 
for prescription drugs and for medical devices, to enhance the post-
market authorities of the Food and Drug Administration with respect 
to the safety of drugs, and for other purposes. 
Id.  
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tem,”
207
 and for “postmarket drug safety information for patients and 
providers,” which would create a website containing information 
about drug safety, labeling, and other materials.
208
  As part of the 
FDAAA, the FDA was also granted the express authority to ensure the 
safety of new drugs by imposing Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strat-
egies (“REMS”).
209
  REMS are required plans that ensure “the benefits 
of the [new] drug outweigh the risks.”
210
 
With respect to medical devices, device sponsors cannot make 
any changes to PMA approved devices that would affect safety or ef-
fectiveness without first receiving the FDA’s permission.
211
  If the de-
vice sponsor wants to change the device, the sponsor must submit a 
supplemental application that is subject to a similar review process as 
the initial PMA.
212
  Approved devices are also subject to further post-
approval protections.  PMA can be withdrawn if, among other things, 
the device is found to be unsafe or ineffective, if new information 
demonstrates that a reasonable assurance of safety and efficacy no 
longer exists, if false statements were made in the PMA application, 
or if the methods for manufacturing the device were nonconform-
ing.
213
  Moreover, one can research the safety of medical devices on 
the Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience Database 
(“MAUDE”), which contains voluntary, facility, distributor, and man-
ufacturer “reports of adverse events involving medical devices,” and 
provides a searchable online database that contains information 
about medical devices that have “malfunctioned or caused a death or 
serious injury.”
214
 
Despite the recent difficulties that the FDA has experienced in 
achieving its mission due to financial constraints, the FDA has taken 
action to correct this problem.  More specifically, through its 2010 
budget request, the FDA took initiatives to make sure that it could 
 
 207 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3)(B)(ii) (LexisNexis 2010).   
 208 § 355(r).  
 209 See Gerald F. Masoudi, Legal Developments in the Enforcement of Food and Drug 
Law, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 585, 586–87 (2008) (describing how the FDAAA through 
REMS expands the FDA’s authority to ensure the “benefits of the drug outweigh the 
risks”). 
 210 Id. at 586. 
 211 § 360e(d)(6)(A)(i).  
 212 Id. 
 213 § 360e(e).   
 214 Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience Database—(MAUDE), U.S. FOOD 
AND DRUG ADMIN.,  http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulation 
andGuidance/PostmarketRequirements/ReportingAdverseEvents/ucm127891.htm 
(last visited Sept. 1, 2010). 
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fulfill its mission in the future.
215
  In 2010, the FDA requested 3.2 bil-
lion dollars to better enable it to protect and promote health; this 
amount was nineteen percent more than what was requested in 
2009.
216
  Specifically, the FDA denoted that 166.4 million dollars 
would be allocated to improving the safety of medical products, in-
cluding devices and drugs.
217
  The FDA also requested 67.5 million 
dollars for drugs and 4.5 million dollars for medical devices to fund 
the review process of each.
218
  This funding for 2010 allowed the FDA 
to initiate “a distributed network of electronic health data that can 
track the safety of [drugs] . . . once they reach the market and quickly 
investigate potential safety signals,” and the funding allowed the FDA 
to “release[] key guidance defining a path for more efficient and ef-
fective clinical trials” for medical devices.
219
 
For 2011, the FDA requested 4 billion dollars to protect and 
promote public health.
220
  The FDA is also planning on hiring 215 
full-time staff members “for programs that protect patients and sup-
port the safety and effectiveness of medical devices” and drugs.
221
  
Additionally, the FDA is taking initiatives to protect Americans from 
high-risk drugs and medical devices; for example, the FDA plans to 
create a National Medical Device Registry that would “link unique 
identifiers for medical devices with electronic health data.”
222
 
While the FDA is not perfect, neither are manufacturers or 
members of a jury.
223
  The FDA has doctors and other scientific ex-
perts reviewing the applications for approval and is far more qualified 
than lay juries to ensure that public health is protected and that 
 
 215 See Press Release, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., President’s FY 2010 Budget for 
FDA Invests Substantially in Food and Medical Product Safety: $3.2 billion request 
reflects a 19 percent increase from FY 2009 (May 7, 2009) available at 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm 
152276.htm. 
 216 Id.  
 217 Id.  
 218 Id.  
 219 The President’s Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Request for FDA: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Agric., Rural Dev., Food and Drug Admin., and Related Agencies of the S. Comm. on Ap-
propriations (March 9, 2010) (statement of Margaret A. Hamburg, Comm’r of Food 
and Drugs), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/ 
ucm204379.htm. 
 220 Id. 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id.   
 223 See Hutt Statement, supra note 16, at 10–11 (comparing the FDA as an expert 
agency and a jury as a group of random individuals). 
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drugs and devices are safe and effective.
224
  In the context of preemp-
tion, “the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone,”
225
 and 
Congress “made its ‘purpose’ plain” when it gave the FDA authority 
to regulate the approval of drugs and devices.
226
  Nothing in the 
FDCA indicates that the FDA should be second-guessed by juries, and 
preemption by its very nature allows the FDA to achieve its mission 
because it prevents state tort juries from questioning the FDA’s ap-
proval of a drug or device. 
227
  The FDA should not be second 
guessed, and the FDA should be the only entity with the ability to im-
pose requirements to determine and ensure the safety and efficacy of 
products.  If too many entities evaluate the safety and efficacy of new 
drugs and medical devices and question the FDA’s determination of 
approval, the public health may be endangered.  No one will really 
know whether a drug or device is safe and effective because the FDA 
will not have the last word.  Consequently, preemption is a beneficial 
legal principle in the context of medical devices and drugs based on 
the FDA’s expertise and rigor in the pre and post-approval processes.  
This expertise and rigor makes preemption the method that posses 
the least amount of danger to public health. 
A further argument in favor of preemption is the fact that the 
FDA has indicated its position in favor of preemption.
228
  Historically, 
the Supreme Court has deferred to the FDA’s interpretation of its au-
thority.
229
  In United States v. Bacto-Unidisk, the Supreme Court noted 
that “remedial legislation such as the [FDCA] is to be given liberal 
construction consistent with the Act’s overriding purpose to protect 
the public health[.]”
230
  In Bacto-Unidisk, the Court deferred to the 
FDA and upheld its construction of the FDCA because it was enough 
for the Court that the expert agency, the FDA, had determined that 
the regulation in question was desirable for public health.
231
  The 
 
 224 See id.; see also Luther Statement, supra note 174.  
 225 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Malone v. 
White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978)). 
 226 Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1219 (2009); see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 
518 U.S. 470, 474–75 (1996). 
 227 See Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163, 178 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 228 See supra note 168 and accompanying text.  
 229 See James T. O’Reilly, Losing Deference in the FDA’s Second Century: Judicial Review, 
Politics, and a Diminished Legacy of Expertise, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 939, 947 (2008) (de-
scribing the types of deference given to the FDA and explaining that one type is de-
ference “to Agency interpretations of its statutory delegation of authority over foods, 
drugs, medical devices, and related products”).  
 230 United States v. Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 798 (1969). 
 231 Id. at 791–92.  In this pre-MDA case, the Court followed the FDA’s determina-
tion and held that the FDCA’s drug provisions covered sensitivity discs.  Id. at 800. 
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Court also emphasized that it was “hardly qualified” to second-guess 
the FDA’s approval.
232
  Currently, the FDA contends that its regula-
tions should preempt conflicting state laws and that its approval 
represents both a floor and a ceiling;
233
 therefore, deference should 
be given to this position. 
B. Is FDA Approval Sufficient to Promote the Public Health? 
FDA approval and preemption are not only superior to state tort 
claims when it comes to protecting the public health but also when it 
comes to promoting the public health.  The FDA has been an impor-
tant mechanism in promoting public health by allowing for the de-
velopment and approval of new technology and innovations
234
 that 
make medical devices and drugs “more effective, safe[], and . . . af-
fordable.”
235
  The FDA’s approval process ensures that innovation is 
not stifled,
236
 and preemption can also encourage innovation by 
preempting state tort claims
237
 because the threat of liability and ex-
pensive litigation arguably deter the development of new technolo-
gy.
238
  Both the pharmaceutical industry and the FDA have supported 
this argument.  The pharmaceutical industry believes that the possi-
bility of tort liability would deter the creation of new beneficial 
drugs.
239
  The FDA has indicated that state and common law tort 
claims can lead to large damage awards that may influence manufac-
turers to remove FDA approved products from the market, even 
though the products have been found safe and effective by the FDA, 
 
 232 Id. at 791–92.  
 233 See Requirements I, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934–35 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified 
at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, and 601). 
 234 See 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(1) (2006) (describing the FDA’s mission to promote 
and protect). 
 235 See also What We Do, supra note 20 (describing the FDA’s mission).  
 236 See Contact Lens Mfrs. Ass’n. v. Food & Drug Admin. of Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 766 F.2d 592, 594 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (describing the FDA’s approval 
process).   
 237 Catherine T. Struve, The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance, Com-
pensation, and the Role of Litigation, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 587, 655 
(2005). 
 238 Wartman, supra note 152, at 310–11; Device Industry Says Anti-Preemption Bill 
Would Hurt Innovation, FDA WEEK, Apr. 17, 2009 (quoting Stephen Ubi, the president 
and CEO of AdvaGMed).   
 239 Brief for PhRMA and BIO as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Wyeth v. Le-
vine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249), 2008 WL 2322236 at *3. 
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or to refrain from researching and developing new drugs or devices 
in the future.
240
 
Without preemption, manufacturers must comply with both the 
FDA’s regulations and different state regulations, which may also 
compel manufacturers to remove their products from the market or 
refrain from researching and developing new products.
241
  This is es-
pecially possible if states impose additional requirements that were 
not originally required by the FDA for approval.
242
  As explained in 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Riegel, the inclusion of an express 
preemption provision in the MDA indicates that concern over the 
risks of devices and the injuries they could cause was outweighed by 
“Congress’s estimation by solicitude for those who would suffer with-
out new medical devices if juries were allowed to apply the tort law of 
50 States to all innovations.”
243
  Preemption is beneficial because it 
aids not only those who would potentially be helped but also those 
who would consequently be harmed if the device or drug is no longer 
available or was not available in the first place.
244
 
C. Other Advantages of Preemption 
As indicated by Riegel and Wyeth, preemption is also beneficial 
because it protects manufacturers from liability when a doctor’s neg-
ligence is the reason for the risk.
245
  In Riegel, although preemption 
applied and the manufacturer was shielded from liability, the adverse 
 
 240 See Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163, 178 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Catherine 
T. Struve, Greater and Lesser Powers of Tort Reform: The Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine and 
State-Law Claims Concerning FDA-Approved Products, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1039, 1039–40 
(2008).  Thus, state tort suits limit access to these beneficial drugs and devices.  See 
Luther Statement, supra note 174 (explaining that state tort suits might “limit[] pa-
tient and doctor choices and decrease[] patient access to beneficial products”). 
 241 Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 351 (2001).    
 242 See Bruce Patsner, Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.: Revisiting Preemption from Medical 
Devices, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 305, 311 (2009) (quoting Ted Olson, Medtronic Inc.’s 
counsel); see Wartman, supra note 152, at 310–11 (quoting Steven Ubi, “A patchwork 
approach to medical device approvals where state courts effectively review and regu-
late medical devices would likely result in a dizzying array of conflicting labeling and 
indications for use and ultimately may result in life-saving, life-enhancing technolo-
gies simply not being available for patients.”); see, e.g., Horn, 376 F.3d at 178 (discuss-
ing the FDA’s argument that “[s]tate common law tort actions threaten the statutory 
framework for the regulation of medical devices”); see also Gilbert Ross, FDA Supreme, 
For Now, WASH. TIMES, March 5, 2008, at A14 (“[D]anger of suits in state after state 
can create a disincentive to put drugs through the centralized FDA approval in the 
first place.”). 
 243 Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 326 (2008). 
 244 See Hutt Statement, supra note 16, at 12.  
 245 This argument is beyond the scope of this Comment, but it is still important 
considering the facts of Riegel and Wyeth.   
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reaction was the result of Mr. Riegel’s surgeon taking actions specifi-
cally warned against in the device’s label.
246
  During Mr. Riegel’s sur-
gery, his surgeon inflated the catheter to a level beyond the maxi-
mum indicated on the label.
247
  Additionally, the device’s label 
warned against using the catheter in a patient with a diffusely dis-
eased and heavily calcified coronary artery; because Mr. Riegel’s co-
ronary artery was both, the catheter ruptured, and he was forced to 
undergo emergency coronary bypass surgery.
248
 
Conversely, in Wyeth, no preemption was found and the manu-
facturer was not shielded from liability.
249
  Phenergan’s label warned 
that extreme care should be used because injections were in close 
proximity to arteries and veins.
250
  The warning indicated that a po-
tential risk of the drug was both gangrene and amputation.
251
  The 
warning also stated that the use of an IV-drip was preferable and that 
the injection should be stopped as soon as the patient complained of 
pain.
252
  In Ms. Levine’s case, a physician’s assistant, not a doctor, ad-
ministered more of the drug than the label prescribed and may have 
injected the drug directly into an artery.
253
  Moreover, the physician’s 
assistant did not stop the injection when Ms. Levine indicated that 
she was in pain; in her testimony, the physician’s assistant stated that 
she never thought “an antecubital injection of Phenergan could hit 
an artery,” and when asked why she did not stop when Ms. Levine 
complained of pain, she said that it would have been “just crazy” to be 
concerned about an intra-arterial injection.
254
  The physician’s assis-
tant clearly disregarded or never read Phenergan’s label warnings. 
In such professional channels, an “upstream player should never 
be held accountable for the mistakes of downstream players.”
255
  If 
manufacturers of drugs or devices will be liable for the mistakes of 
doctors without preemption, this possible liability may also deter 
them from creating new products.  A manufacturer, who would be li-
able based on claims that the FDA approved label is faulty, would not 
 
 246 Riegel, 552 U.S. at 320 (2008). 
 247 Id.  
 248 Id.  
 249 Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1191 (2009). 
 250 Id. at 1192 n.1.  
 251 Id. 
 252 Id. at 1192.   
 253 Id. at 1194.  
 254 Id. at 1226–27 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 255 Richard A. Epstein, The Case for Field Preemption of State Laws in Drug Cases, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 463, 471 (2009). 
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want to be found liable because of a physician’s negligence.  In addi-
tion to preemption, initiating a medical malpractice suit against the 
physician instead of a tort claim against the manufacturer may be 
more appropriate in such cases.  The physician, who reads the label, 
determines the medical device to use or the drug to prescribe.  If the 
FDA has approved the drug or device, liability should then fall to the 
physician for his or her negligence and not to the manufacturer for 
complying with the FDA’s approval process. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 
The advantages of preemption are superior to the advantages of 
the state tort system in the context of medical devices and new drugs, 
and the FDA-approval process sufficiently examines drugs and devic-
es.
256
  The MDSA or future similar legislation should not be passed, 
and express preemption should continue for Class III medical devices 
that have received premarket approval.  Currently, however, only 
PMA medical devices can receive the advantages of preemption, as no 
express or implied preemption applies for new drugs.  To ensure that 
new drugs receive the same preemption advantages as PMA medical 
devices and to rectify the disparity caused by the Riegel and Wyeth de-
cisions, the FDCA should be amended to include an express preemp-
tion provision for new drugs.  This provision would amend the drug-
approval section of the FDCA, § 505, and would introduce a provision 
similar to the PMA medical device express preemption provision.  It 
would create a uniform standard of preemption for new drugs and 
PMA medical devices. 
A. Why an Express Preemption Provision Is Now Needed 
Thirty years ago, Congress only enacted an express preemption 
provision for PMA medical devices and not for new drugs.
257
  At that 
time, an express preemption provision for new drugs was not neces-
sary because the FDA subjected new drugs to a premarket-review 
process for safety and efficacy;
258
 until Wyeth, there was still the possi-
bility of implied preemption.  As the Supreme Court stated in Wyeth, 
if Congress thought an express preemption provision was needed for 
drugs and that “state-law suits posed an obstacle to its objectives,” it 
would have also created an express preemption provision for drugs.
259
  
 
 256 See supra Part IV.   
 257 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2006); Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1200. 
 258 See supra Part II.A. 
 259 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1200.  
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Unlike medical devices, no state rules “required premarket approval 
of the drugs . . . so no preemption clause was needed as a check 
against potentially conflicting state regulatory regimes.”
260
 
Express preemption is now needed and justified for new drugs.
261
  
The proposed MDSA and the Wyeth decision indicate that an express 
preemption provision for new drugs is necessary because state tort 
suits pose an obstacle to the drug development process.  Congress has 
already enacted express preemption provisions for almost all of the 
other products covered by the FDCA, including medical devices, 
cosmetics,
262
 and nonprescription drugs.
263
  Therefore, if Congress al-
so enacted an express preemption provision for new drugs, it would 
not be unreasonable as new drugs undergo one of the most rigorous 
approval processes. 
B. Why New Drugs and Medical Devices Should Be Treated Uniformly 
as to Preemption 
The FDA is responsible for protecting the public health by en-
suring the safety and efficacy of drugs and medical devices.
264
  The 
FDA reviews the applications for new drugs and medical devices to 
ensure their safety and efficacy before these products can enter the 
market.
265
  The review process for both is rigorous;
266
 however, the two 
processes are distinct.
267
 
 The initial difference is found in the sections of the FDCA 
where the approval processes are located.  New drugs are approved 
based on the procedures found in § 505 of the FDCA, and PMA de-
vices are approved based on the procedures found in § 513 and § 515 
of the FDCA.
268
  New drugs and medical devices are subject to differ-
ent standards for determining safety and efficacy.
269
  The PMA process 
 
 260 Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 342 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 261 See supra Part IV. 
 262 § 379s.   
 263 Id. § 379r.   
 264 Id. § 393(b)(2)(B)–(C).  
 265 See supra Part II.B–C.    
 266 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475, 477 (1996) (explaining that the 
PMA process “is a rigorous one”); see Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 343 
(2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he process for approving new drugs is as least 
as rigorous as the premarket approval process for medical devices.”). 
 267 Peter Barton Hutt, Richard A. Merrill & Alan M. Kirschenbaum, The Standard 
of Evidence Required for Premarket Approval Under the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 
47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 605, 606–07 (1992).   
 268 § 355; id. § 360c; id. §360e. 
 269 Hutt, supra note 267, at 607 (comparing the approval processes).   
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requires that the medical device application provides a “reasonable 
assurance” that the device is safe and effective,
270
 but § 505 does not 
contain the same requirement.
271
  For new drugs, the effectiveness 
standard is “substantial evidence,” which requires that the application 
provide “substantial evidence that the drug will have the effect it pur-
ports . . . to have under the conditions of use prescribed, recom-
mended, or suggested in the proposed labeling.”
272
  PMA devices re-
quire a more flexible standard for effectiveness; the PMA process 
does not include a “substantial evidence” requirement, and instead, 
effectiveness “may be established ‘on the basis of well-controlled in-
vestigations, including [one or more] clinical investigations.’”
273
  
Many, including the FDA, have indicated that the review and approv-
al process for new drugs is more rigorous than PMA.
274
  If PMA em-
ploys a lower standard that grants express preemption to manufac-
turers of PMA medical devices, new drug manufacturers who are 
subject to a more rigorous standard should be given the same, if not 
more, protections from liability.  If PMA devices are subject to 
preemption, new drugs should be as well.  Therefore, an express 
preemption provision for new drugs is both appropriate and in the 
public’s best interest. 
C. An Express Preemption Provision for New Drugs 
In drafting the language for the express preemption provision, § 
360k of the MDA is the best model.  The amendment would add § 
355(w) to the FDCA, and in following the model of § 360k, it could 
be written as follows: 
(w) General rule.  No State or political subdivision of a State may 
establish or continue in effect with respect to a new drug any re-
quirement (1) which is different from, or in addition to, any re-
quirement applicable under this Act [21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq.] to 
 
 270 § 360c(a)(1)(A)(i).  
 271 Hutt, supra note 267, at 607 (distinguishing the approval processes).  
 272 § 355(d). 
 273 Hutt, supra note 267, at 608 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(3)(B) (2006)).    
 274 See id. at 608–09 (“Congress intended medical device manufacturers seeking 
[PMA] to be subject to a different, more flexible, standard of evidence of safety and 
effectiveness than new drug sponsors.”); see also Gostin, supra note 164, at 2313 
(2008) (explaining that the standard for new drugs is higher than the standard for 
PMA); William M. Brown, Déjà Vu All Over Again: The Exodus from Contraceptive Re-
search and How to Reverse It, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 1, 9 (2001) (“FDA’s regulation of drugs is 
considered by many to be the most stringent in the world.”); Requirements I, 71 
Fed.Reg. 3922, 3967 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, and 
601). (“The FDA review process for an NDA is thorough and scientifically rigor-
ous.”). 
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the drug, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the 
new drug or to any other matter included in a requirement appli-
cable to the new drug under this Act [21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq.].  
This provision would preempt state drug requirements that are dif-
ferent from or in addition to any federal new drug requirement, with 
that being the § 505-approval process.
275
  According to the Court in 
Riegel, the § 505-approval process would have to be found a require-
ment, and it would have to be a requirement specific to individual 
drugs.
276
  Because the approval process for new drugs is more rigorous 
and requires a stricter standard for safety and effectiveness than the 
premarket-approval process for Class III medical devices, the Su-
preme Court may be even more likely to find it is a specific require-
ment relating to safety and effectiveness.
277
  Assuming the § 505-
approval process is found to be a requirement, any state requirement 
that conflicted with the FDA’s approval process for new drugs would 
be preempted. 
Application of the express preemption provision would only ex-
tend to new drugs for which a sponsor actually files a NDA under § 
355(b).  For example, drugs approved by filing an abbreviated new 
drug application (“ANDA”) under § 355(j) would not fall within the 
express preemption provision because ANDA applications only re-
quire the application to demonstrate that the conditions of use have 
already been approved for another drug.
278
  ANDA applications are 
filed for generic drugs and must only be proved a bioequivalent.
279
 
 
 275 Because preemption alone will not replace the compensation mechanism of 
the state tort system, Congress should also consider creating a compensation pro-
gram that would compensate individuals injured by new drugs.  Currently, no com-
pensation program exists for adverse reactions to drugs other than individual tort 
actions, and one of the main reasons that critics argue against preemption is that 
there is no opportunity for compensation for the harm suffered. See Gostin, supra 
note 164, at 2315; Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1202 (2009) (describing the neg-
atives of preemption).  Therefore, a compensation scheme would also be advisable to 
make up for the fact that injured parties would be precluded from seeking compen-
sation if there is express preemption.  Such a scheme could be added as a subsection 
to the express preemption amendment.   
 276 Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 323 (2008) (explaining that “premar-
ket approval is specific to individual devices”).   
 277 See supra note 274 and accompanying text; see also Riegel, 552 U.S. at 323.   
 278 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i) (2006).  The ANDA process seems similar to the § 
510(k) approval process of substantial equivalence and would most likely not meet 
the requirement of being a specific requirement as indicated in Medtronic and Riegel.  
See supra notes 75–77, 113, 123 and accompanying text.   
 279 § 355(j).  Bioequivalence is defined as “the absence of a significant difference 
in the rate and extent to which the active ingredient or active moiety in pharmaceut-
ical equivalents or pharmaceutical alternatives becomes available at the site of drug 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court decisions of Riegel and Wyeth created a dis-
crepancy in the way medical devices and new drugs are treated in the 
context of preemption.  New drugs and medical devices are both sub-
ject to FDA approval and a finding of safety and efficacy; however, 
even though new drugs are subject to a more rigorous approval 
process, premarket-approved medical-device manufacturers are im-
mune from state tort claims and new-drug manufacturers are not.  
The main basis for this discrepancy is the lack of an express preemp-
tion provision for new drugs. 
Although this discrepancy has initiated proposed legislation to 
remove preemption for PMA devices and create a uniform standard 
of no preemption, the better solution would be to create a uniform 
standard of preemption.  The advantages of preemption outweigh 
the advantages of the state tort system, and preemption can help re-
medy the problems of the state tort system.  Preemption prevents the 
FDA, Congress’s expert for drug and device approval, from being 
second guessed by a jury that does not have its experience or exper-
tise.  Preemption allows the FDA to have the final word on safety and 
efficacy, and it ensures that the public is protected.  Preemption also 
allows for the development of new, innovative drugs and medical de-
vices and prevents manufacturers from being liable for a physician’s 
negligence.  Preemption is needed for the development of drugs and 
medical devices and to ensure that both are safe and effective.  Thus, 
the MDA’s express preemption provision for PMA devices should re-
main intact, and the FDCA should be amended to include an express 
preemption provision for new drugs so that consumers can continue 
to have access to and protection from drugs and medical devices. 
 
 
action when administered at the same molar dose under similar conditions in an ap-
propriately designed study.”  21 C.F.R. § 320.1(e).  
